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The
Crisis of Islam by Bernard Lewis
Review by Karen Hart
As Americans
observe the second anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, many
search for signs of progress to justify
the financial, human and political cost. The
neo-cons insist that "freedom
is on the march," taking credit for Palestinian elections
and Lebanese demonstrations as inspired by Iraqi
elections. But Persian Gulf politics defy linear progressions,
as evidenced by
increasing insurgent attacks and missile-flexing
by hardliners in Iran. Ousting the Taliban has not prevented narco-warlords,
liberated women outside Kabul, or captured Bin
Laden. In the context
of these contradictions, our progressive book
club has chosen The Crisis of Islam to inform our understanding
of Muslims, Middle
Eastern history and U.S. foreign policy as we
grapple with the questions haunting us since 9/11:
Do Muslims "hate us for our freedom"?
Most Gulf residents envy our freedom to worship, to elect officials and
speak freely of the need for change. They resent our support for their corrupt
tyrants (especially in countries where we fear theocracy) and our willingness
to ignore their economic and social oppression to ensure the free flow of oil.
Much of their anger would be directed at their own governments if was not brutally
suppressed, but religious fervor or anti-western protests are allowed to the
extent they serve as a safety valve and do not threaten their own autocratic
regimes. The Iraqi insurgency represents a localized concentration of those
who benefit from the autocracy and those religious extremists who seek to purge
the area of western influence.
Why has terrorism now spread to the West?
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. emerged as
the unrivaled military and economic power. Arabs could no longer
play our enemies against
us, and militant factions resorted to the methods used by the PLO to
instill fear in a much stronger Israel. Because of the greater
access to information
through satellite TV and the Internet, the "Arab street" is increasingly
aware of their poverty and repression relative to the West. The Gulf
Wars and rising unemployment and economic instability since that time have
further fueled
the anger and violence.
Why are Americans singled out as the Great Satan?
We symbolize the culture of decadence, greed, secularism,
and exploitation which encroaches on their traditional societies.
While our support for Israel
and our invading sacred soil are often criticized, our support for Arab
autocrats is a more personal affront to most Muslims. We alone
have the power to oust
dictators, and so far our foreign policy has reflected our Administration’s
economic interests, not the well-being of the region. Because our citizens
elect the government, some extremists feel civilians are fair game in
their attacks.
Does the Koran advocate terrorism and suicide attacks?
No. Suicide is not condoned, nor are attacks on civilians or indiscriminate
casualties. Traditionally, assassins killed only political opponents,
as did the modern fidayeen in post-war Iran. Only since the 1967 defeat of
the Arab
armies by Israel did terrorists—starting with the PLO—abandon the
Shari’a-sanctioned rules of engagement to target unarmed crowds. Their
methods, including suicide bombings, hijackings and kidnapping of non-combatants,
have no place in Islamic tradition or law.
Why is the current conflict cast in terms of a "crusade"?
Bush’s unfortunate choice of words in the immediate aftermath of 9/11
played into the rhetoric of leaders such as Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden,
who attract support by drawing parallels between their battles against west’s "imperialism" and
Saladin’s expelling the Crusaders from Jerusalem in 1187. By tapping the
common Islamic history and emotional language of ancient conflicts with "infidels," clerics
and politicians seek to reconstitute the Islamic unity that disappeared
with the last Caliphate in 1924.
Why is there no similar backlash against Muslims who kill
their own kind?
In closed societies such as Iran and Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan, the press cannot safely report on atrocities,
and therefore tend to magnify
events in places like Israel (where Arab governments encourage journalists
to focus their attention). In the Middle East, where national boundaries
represent arbitrarily-drawn maps by European conquerors in
the 20th century, Muslims
prefer to identify themselves along religious and ethnic lines. The traditional
Bedouin culture emphasizes solidarity within the tribe and loyalty to
leaders, while discouraging cooperation—or transparent communication—with
outsiders. This explains our unproductive partnership with Pakistan against
Al-Qa’ida, and the muted response to atrocities committed by Arab dictators.
Of course, government officials are reluctant to criticize regimes which
employ repressive tactics uncomfortably similar to their own. Islamic fundamentalists
reserve their harshest rebukes for Muslims whom they consider apostates,
so
Gulf State tyrants keep the criticism focused squarely on Jewish and
Christian countries.
Is Islam a fundamentally violent and intolerant religion?
No, tolerance and diversity are encouraged by the Koran, but the Wahibi
sect is gaining influence through its worldwide network of madrasas. In many
countries and communities, Muslims have no other access to formal Islamic education,
and are increasingly exposed to this regressive interpretation of the Koran.
The United States has financed these madrasas indirectly through oil purchases
from Saudi Arabia, since its government appeases the sect with financing to
diffuse political dissent.
What crisis does Islam face?
Internally, the faithful must confront the challenge
of interpreting the Prophet’s teachings in the context of their globalized modern lives.
Muslims living in relatively open societies outside the Middle East must balance
liberalizing pressures from the mainstream—generally Christian—societies
with traditional teachings (often conveyed through Wahibi-financed madrasas).
Those living in Gulf states must conduct any debate under the watchful eye
of nervous rulers and powerful clerics. The external crisis threatens governments
beyond the Muslim world, especially if the terrorists win the hearts and minds
of large groups abroad. If the extremists gain popular opinion, they could
trigger Chechnya-style repressions and expand the cycle of violence. The challenge,
as evidenced in Turkey, involves accommodating religious expression as well
as economic and political reforms. Unfortunately, the progressive policies
which advance material gains threaten religious traditions—in the case
of universal education, gender equality and family planning—and the political
establishment—in joining the information age and the international standards
of commerce and governance.
Long term, of course, the U.S. should reduce its demand for oil and help
the Muslim world through a peaceful transition to representative government
and diversified economies which foster political stability and social
progress. I look forward to a lively discussion of the short-term scenarios
and solutions
which could play out in the meantime. Enjoy Professor Lewis’s thought-provoking
analysis, and I’ll see you on the 13th!